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1.  Purpose of the paper - causes of the crisis 
In line with the mandate of the committee this paper does not discuss problems of managing the 
present crisis. It rather deals with elements of a future financial architecture which should help to 
avoid a repetition of past developments. The recommendations include: Higher transparency, proper 
incentive structures, better regulation, efficient supervision, and improved international cooperation 
among authorities. 
The global crisis in financial markets is the consequence of a dynamic interaction between factors in 
the macro and the micro side of the economy. The combination of massive liquidity and low interest 
rates has caused sharp increases in asset prices, especially in the housing sector of many countries. In 
an environment of inadequate regulation and important gaps in supervisory oversight, inappropriate 
incentive structures have promoted short-termism and encouraged the production of complex 
financial instruments, supported by high degrees of leverage. Overall, the situation in booming 
financial markets became more and more unsustainable. It needed only a trigger to collapse. This 
trigger was delivered when house prices in the US started to fall with the expectation that this would 
continue for an extended period of time. 
 
2.  Recommendations 
2.1. Incentives 
This section discusses three major cases of incentive misalignment that have greatly contributed, on 
the micro level, to the current financial crisis. These cases refer to structured finance, rating agencies, 
and management compensation. They all contributed to an understatement of true default risk, 
generating mispricing of credit instruments. We deal with the structuring of securitization 
transactions first, since it is here where the current crisis started. We then turn to the role of rating 
agencies, and lastly to management compensation. To the extent that our recommendations relate to 
better information for investors, it will be covered in the following subsection on transparency  
a)  Rating agencies 
Rating agencies are the major information provider for bond investors in capital markets around 
the world. By inappropriately applying their long-established bond rating standards to the 
valuation of structured finance products (tranches), rating agencies have compromised their 
credibility. In order to re-establish trust in structured finance ratings, a number of new rules 
should be enforced. For this purpose, agencies should be subjected to regulatory oversight, 
albeit in a limited way.  
-  Rating performance (i.e. the long-term statistics relating initial ratings to subsequent 
defaults) should be monitored by the supervisors, applying high standards of 
transparency and statistics. Rating performance will be published regularly (e.g., once a 
year).  
-  To minimize rating shopping, unsolicited ratings are encouraged (e.g. by mandatory 
rating disclosure).  
-  Authorities should continue to review their use of structured finance ratings in the 
regulatory and supervisory framework und reduce the use to the extent possible in order 
to limit the pressure on agencies, e.g. in consumer protection regulation.  
-  Furthermore, rating fees may be linked to rating performance (either by linking it to 
default statistics, or by linking it to individual tranche performance; in the latter case, 
agencies essentially buy into the tranches they rate).  An annual report on rating practice   3
and rating competition by a central oversight body may help to monitor market integrity 
and quality.   
b)  Structured finance 
The pooling and tranching of loan portfolios requires special provisions to ensure that the 
underlying relationships between borrowers and lenders remain intact. Securitizations issued 
during the past few years typically did not meet these requirements. In order to realign 
incentives, the whereabouts of the tranches that carry most of the risk, the first loss pieces, has 
to be public knowledge. This will ensure that the market can once again price individual 
securities properly (see the corresponding paragraph under “Transparency”).  
c)  Compensation 
Management incentives have increasingly focused on short-term performance, disregarding 
longer-term risks. For instance, various instruments were used to frontend-load financial 
transactions, and by carving out income via short-term bonuses to management and employees. 
Since the compensation system influences management behaviour, a stronger reliance on long 
term performance of investment strategies is required in order to achieve an appropriate 
incentive alignment. New compensation models may be needed that allow striking a proper 
balance between long and short term orientation, involving bonus and malus components. Such 
schemes could resemble pension annuities rather than all-cash-out payments. Since 
compensation schemes should not be dictated by government decree, disclosure to investors will 
be a reasonable regulatory strategy (see the corresponding paragraph under “Transparency”). Of 
course, regulators may contribute to identifying sound practice principles for compensation 
schemes.  
 
2.2. Transparency 
The objective of an increase in transparency is to overcome opaqueness which has prevented 
investors to assess the risks of financial instruments correctly. The opaqueness, in turn, is to a 
large extent the consequence of misaligned incentives in many areas of the financial value chain. 
Thus, by specifying rules of disclosure, the market will be once again enabled to price-
differentiate between financial instruments, taking incentive alignment differentials into account. 
a)  Structured finance: We propose to make it mandatory that in securitization transactions the 
economic first loss position is described and its allocation in the market is treated as a bond 
covenant, and is disclosed to the market, thereby avoiding opaqueness of bank portfolio risk. 
Disclosure is needed for the market to adequately price risks and thus induce banks to retain 
first loss pieces, and to apply sound banking practices. Since the size of the first loss piece 
alone does not determine the amount of risk retained, the stipulation of any mandatory 
retention rate has to be discussed carefully. Rating agencies and other information providers 
(e.g. auditors) are supposed to report regularly on compliance. The revelation of first loss 
pieces allocation among market participants may even be used to ease tensions on today’s 
interbank markets.  
b)  Compensation: We propose disclosing, on a regular basis, the incentive components in 
management compensation schemes, and to encourage rating agencies (and other 
information providers, like auditors) to report a firm-level metric that captures incentive 
alignment. Mandatory rules on management compensation, such as salary caps or bonus 
limits, are not advocated, as they are expected to backfire.    4
c)  Risk map: An internationally coordinated effort in creating the institutional background for 
drawing, on a regular basis, a global financial risk map is recommended. The map involves all 
major international financial institutions, e.g. banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, and 
all major financial products, e.g. loans, credit insurance and CDS, and ABS. The details of 
such a risk reporting system still need to be worked out, possibly by a task force consisting 
of market participants, regulators and academics.  
d)  Credit register: Either as a by-product of the risk map, or as a stand-alone initiative, we 
propose the creation of a global credit register. Such a register compiles major interbank and 
customer-specific exposure data to allow individual market participants, typically those 
institutions that also deliver the raw data, to learn about major exposures of their 
counterparties. While the value of such information is appreciated almost universally on a 
national level, there is nothing commensurate on an international level. However, even the 
best register will not be able to provide an account of total bank exposures in real time.  
e)  Accounting standards are to be reviewed. 
 
2.3. Regulation and Supervision 
The existing regulatory and supervisory system has important weaknesses and gaps (see 1.) and 
should be reformed to avoid the build-up of excessive leverage in the future and to reduce the 
system’s pro-cyclicality. 
 
a)  All gaps in the supervisory system should be closed:  
-  Financial institutions should be supervised on a fully consolidated basis thus inhibiting the scope 
for regulatory arbitrage. 
-  Investment funds operating inside banks, insurance companies or non-financial corporates 
should be supervised comprehensively. 
-  All systemically important financial institutions should be subjected to appropriate supervision 
and regulation 
-  The “indirect” supervision of hedge funds via their regulated creditors needs to be strengthened 
by consolidating the information available from different lenders. 
-   The activities of credit rating agencies should be monitored, including through the 
implementation of the IOSCO´s revised code of conduct (see 2.1.).  
-  Market participants should urgently implement central counterparty clearing for OTC credit  
derivatives. Central counterparty clearing would help to monitor market developments and 
reduce settlement risks. 
-  Compliance of offshore-centers with relevant regulations could be improved through an 
“indirect” approach if all major financial centers cooperate.  
 
b)  Capital requirements should be tightened after the end of the current crisis:  
-  Introduction of an additional overall leverage ratio in addition to the risk-weighted Basel ratio. 
-  Additional capital requirements for SIVs, conduits and off-balance sheet activities unless they are 
fully consolidated.   5
-  Additional capital requirements for lending to hedge funds and lending to non-cooperative off-
shore centers. 
-  Allowance for liquidity risks. 
In addition, capital requirements, provisioning rules and accounting rules should be reviewed to 
make the system less pro-cyclical.  
 
c)  Cooperation among the different authorities and bodies, which are directly or indirectly 
involved in the supervision of financial institutions, should be improved: 
-  Improved information flow between national supervisors to obtain a complete picture of the 
situation of cross-border banks, bank holding companies, hedge funds, and other investment 
funds. 
-  Creation of “global colleges of supervisors” for cross-border banks. 
-  Greater consistency in the regulation of different financial entities (banking, insurance, 
securities). 
-  Enhanced interaction between institutions with experience in assessing macro-prudential risks 
and those in charge of assessing micro-prudential risks. 
 
2.4. International Institutions 
International institutions should play a stronger role in crisis prevention. International institutions 
can help to build a more robust macro-economic policy framework, a key condition for preventing 
future crisis. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s role as an international “watchdog” should be 
strengthened. This relates to macro-economic issues, like global imbalances and exchange rates, and 
to financial markets but the concept of “Bretton Woods II” is misleading. In particular, the IMF 
should re-direct its work towards a deeper and more comprehensive analysis of financial market 
developments in the following way: 
-  A stronger focus on spillovers between financial markets and the real economy.  
-  An assessment of macro-prudential risks.  
-  Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs) should become mandatory for all IMF members 
states.  
-  Analysis of comprehensive data on global financial market developments (as a pre-requisite for a 
global risk map, see 2.1.) in close cooperation with the BIS. 
 
It is important to note the limits of what can be reasonably expected from the IMF: 
-  There is an unavoidable trade-off between the neutrality of the work of the IMF staff, based on 
rules, and the political interests if its shareholders.  
-  The IMF does not have the expertise to act as standard setter for financial markets.  
-  The IMF does not appear to be suitable to become a global supervisor for the largest 
international financial institutions.    6
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), including its committees, is the standard setter in 
financial markets. It will be the key body to adopt most of the measures proposed above (under 
2.3.). However, the BIS suffers from a lack of legitimacy and should broaden its membership 
(particularly in its committees). 
The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) is the key forum to coordinate and advocate regulatory and 
supervisory reforms. But it also suffers from a lack of legitimacy as it is G7-dominated.  
The FSF should continue to be anchored at the BIS but the links between the FSF and the IMF 
should be strengthened. A merger of the FSF with the IMF appears neither feasible nor efficient. 
The membership of the FSF should evolve in line with the future enlargement of the G7/8.  
The European dimension. The current financial crisis has also highlighted the weaknesses in the 
EU’s supervisory framework, which remains fragmented along national lines. A reform of the 
European supervisory framework is essential to protect the Single Market and the Euro and needs to 
go beyond what is feasible globally. European issues will not be discussed by the G-20 but the EU 
should take the lead in implementing the proposals presented in this note. 
3.  Concluding remarks 
A number of our recommendations are more or less straightforward and in line with those by the 
FSF, other institutions, or individual authors. On some issues more information and research is 
needed. This is one reason to warn against premature conclusions and even more against hasty 
decisions. The elements of a new and better financial architecture must interact in a positive way and 
support each other. This cannot be achieved by quick and unavoidably short-sighted actions. It is 
also important that the crisis management –increasingly with the duration and dimension of 
measures- takes into account the impact on the future development of financial markets. This refers 
not only to exit strategies for state interventions in banks etc., but also to the creation for a stable, 
non-inflationary environment. 
Current proposals for strengthening the financial architecture are basically focused on providing 
better rules for private actors. This is very important, but not enough. An analysis of the underlying 
causes of the crisis show that it would not have gained such significant and costly dimensions 
without a macroeconomic environment of massive liquidity and persistently low interest rates. As a 
consequence, sounder macro policies and more prudent rules for individual actors have to go hand 
in hand.   
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Appendix 
A 1.  Causes of the Crisis  
Since the end of the 1990s and thereafter, interest rates have been low and liquidity high 
around the world. This was due in no small part to currency pegging in key regions of the 
world economy. 
The increasing integration of China and other emerging markets into the world economy 
resulted in global pressure on commodity prices. As it picked up speed, globalization limited 
the scope of businesses to increase prices and restrained wage growth in industrialized nations. 
The huge rise in liquidity therefore did not make itself felt on commodity prices for quite a 
while. Nor did the strategy of “inflation targeting”, whilst ignoring money supply and credit 
volumes, encourage central banks to raise interest rates. 
However, the high level of liquidity did not remain without consequences. It led to rising asset 
prices around the world. The combination of high liquidity and low interest rates produced a 
strong incentive to choose ever riskier investments. As a result the premium over secure 
investments became ever smaller. This trend was enhanced by numerous financial innovations. 
The securitization and packaging of financial products – without the originator retaining any 
risk – compounded this trend. Complex products were bought world-wide, and in particular in 
Europe, in Germany not least by institutions with no viable business model of their own. The 
certificates issued by the rating agencies underpinned this behaviour. 
Transparency had largely been lost. It had barely ever existed at global level, and at some stage 
the players themselves retained only a rudimentary overview of their own transactions. A lack 
of regulation was revealed, especially in the USA, where politically leveraged institutions 
(Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae) amplified the real estate boom yet further. In numerous 
countries the banks circumvented capital regulations by establishing new entities for their 
activities. The failure of the oversight regime cannot be excused by the fact that these activities 
were entirely legal. 
This development occurred against a backdrop of financial incentives which rewarded short-
term success – in particular the sale of new financial products – with no reference to the long 
term. Risk management shortcomings within financial institutions have now also been 
revealed. 
While maintaining liquidity and protecting depositors are central mantras of banking 
regulation, the problem of "market liquidity" has been largely neglected. It was blithely 
assumed that it would always be possible to refinance short-term debt via the markets at any 
time. 
These factors combined to produce a situation in which only a slight prod was needed to 
shake the entire (inverse) pyramid, and indeed to bring it toppling down. This prod was 
delivered by the subprime crisis in the USA, the impact of which first shook the German 
banking world for the reasons familiar to us all and continued to spread. In the aftermath, 
these ripples produced by the real estate crisis spread to the countries that were more or less 
predestined for it because their housing markets had been overheated for years. 
It would however be too simplistic and indeed misleading to blame the crisis entirely on the 
subprime troubles and the real estate markets. As important as this factor is – and as important 
as an end to the housing-market crisis in the US is for worldwide recovery – the subprime 
disaster was only the trigger that sparked off a worldwide financial crisis. Risks were re-
evaluated everywhere – the spreads, risk premiums rose abruptly, and the high volatility of the   8
evaluations contributed to further insecurity. Access to short-term refinancing on the markets 
was abruptly cut off. This caused an undreamt of liquidity crisis. With the collapse of their 
assets, the banks' capital ratio was put under immense pressure, and the first institutions had to 
be taken over or "rescued". The sense of insecurity reached a peak with the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers. 
Since that time, the authorities in many countries have taken ever more aggressive steps to 
stabilize the financial situation. Liquidity infusions have been increased, government 
guarantees have been offered for various forms of private debt, and public sector funds have 
been offered to support the recapitalization of banks. While we are still a very long way from 
restoring trust in the markets and between stakeholders, these efforts do seem to have 
improved the financial situation somewhat. There have been some signs of a growing 
willingness for banks to lend to each other for periods longer than just a few days. Not 
surprisingly, however, these unusual initiatives have also raised concerns about “moral hazard” 
looking forward.  
Nor can it be judged that the worst of the crisis is behind us. While the financial situation 
might temporarily appear better, the deterioration in the real side of the global economy is 
becoming increasingly evident. Household consumption has weakened sharply, particularly in 
countries where saving rates fell markedly under the influence of easy credit conditions. This 
tendency to retrenchment seems likely to be exacerbated both by falling asset prices and 
tightening credit conditions. Investment spending might also fall against such a background. 
Evidently, as the economy slows, both household and corporate bankruptcies will rise. This 
implies further losses to financial institutions and potentially still tighter credit conditions, with 
further impacts on both the real economy and asset prices. In sum, the joint process of 
deleveraging in both the real and financial sectors might still have a significant way to run. 
The seriousness of the current situation evidently raises first the challenge of further policy 
actions to help manage the crisis. At the same time, these circumstances also present us with a 
political window of opportunity for reforms designed to help minimize the severity of future 
crises. This opportunity should not be missed, even if a repetition of recent events might be 
thought unlikely for some time to come.  This fact, that we do have time means that suggested 
reforms can be well researched and carefully thought out in advance.  Impetuous action, 
particularly if motivated by the desire to punish those held to blame for our current troubles, 
could easily prove counterproductive. Well considered and credible reforms, valuable in 
themselves, could also play a significant role in offsetting the moral hazard associated with the 
measures currently needed for crisis management. In this fundamental sense, crisis 
management and crisis prevention should not be seen as substitutes but complements.   
 
A 2.  Improving the Framework 
A 2.1  Incentives  
In this section we discuss several incentive misalignments that are typical for the industry. They 
all work in the same direction, namely they underestimate the true probability of default on the 
debt instruments being offered for sale. We start with the structuring of transactions, then turn 
to the role of rating agencies, and lastly to management compensation.  
The 2007 credit crisis evolved initially around the subprime mortgage market in the US, which 
entailed lending programs, often government sponsored, targeting low wealth individuals. Since 
personal income of debtors tended to be low as well, lending in these markets was typically 
based on asset value alone. Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) offered an easy ways to access 
capital market funding, despite the low incomes of those taking out mortgages. Government   9
sponsored programs (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) played an important role in market 
development, both in terms of increasing market volume, and in terms of pushing debtor quality 
to lower levels. Using mortgage lending to enhance home ownership among lower income strata 
was an explicit objective of US Congress, and government sponsored programs were eager to 
comply.  
Securitization of mortgage loan portfolios, and more generally of all types of consumer and 
commercial lending, is in general a useful way to mobilize funding for retail and commercial 
credit, and as such a viable alternative to bank deposits. Furthermore, properly designed 
securitization programs can address successfully the destruction of lender incentives that might 
be expected to go along with outright loan sales. Careful borrower selection, continuous loan 
monitoring, timely restructuring and intervention in default situations – all these elements of 
prudent and efficient banking can be upheld in securitization transactions. However, incentive 
alignment requires securitization transactions to obey specific technical rules of structuring, 
which in essence put a cap on the amount of risk that can be shed on the market. This rule, 
however, was not respected in securitization markets in recent years. This led to the over-pricing 
of low quality MBS at issue. Similar quality problems have begun to surface in other markets as 
well (e.g. credit card and car loans, and cov-lite corporate loans) with the full impact likely still 
yet to be seen.  
Why did investors not respond rationally by increasing the required risk premium, thereby 
demanding an adequate compensation for the increase in risk? One reason is, in addition to the 
increasing appetite for risk prevailing across virtually all markets at the time, was the lack of 
information on the true risk properties of the underlying loan portfolios, in particular on the 
whereabouts of the first loss position. One has to recall that up until the early years of the 
century, perhaps until 2004, the standard securitization practice entailed retaining the first loss 
position. When, where, and to what extent retention standards in the industry were changing, is 
still largely unknown. But it is consensus opinion that these standards have been weakened over 
time, and that investors were ignorant of these changes for a long time. When investors began to 
focus on the possibility of such changes, probably in mid-2007, it became evident that the prices 
of structured instruments could no longer be based on originally assigned ratings. Combined 
with the more general retreat from imprudent risk taking, this contributed to the virtual shut-
down of markets for structured products. 
This raises the issue of the role of rating agencies (RAs) in these markets. In short, RAs have 
played the role of trusted gatekeepers. ABS market development would not have been possible 
without RAs providing quality assurance about inherently complex financial products to 
unsophisticated investors. Most observers believed that RAs were technically well equipped to 
perform this task, and in particular that the RAs reputational capital would serve as a strong line 
of defence against any compromising of rating standards. We have learned otherwise.  
First, the self-disciplining role of reputation cannot always be relied upon, even under normal 
market conditions. This is particularly true for high quality bonds and notes, mainly because the 
implied default probabilities are so small. It would need very long periods to verify statistically 
that rating standards have been compromised, and it therefore remains unclear how agencies 
that cheated would be punished by the market.  
Second, ratings could be gamed, i.e. clients may have been able to outsmart the rating standards. 
Consider ratings assigned to structured products, like MBA tranches. They are based on   
estimating the loss distribution of the underlying loan portfolio. These estimations rely on 
models that are not fully transparent to the industry. However, RAs provided “customer end” 
tools to their clients which allowed banks to run pre-tests of their new securitization portfolios 
before submitting to the RA. As a result, loan portfolios could be designed in a way that just met   10
the criteria included in the relevant model, but may have additional risk pertaining to criteria not 
included in the model. As an example, consider information on whether first loss tranches are 
retained or not. Although we know that the sale of the so-called first loss piece lowers expected 
portfolio returns, this is not an explicit part of the rating model currently in use, and is therefore 
not reflected in the assigned rating. Hence the issuer can raise its profits by selling first loss 
pieces, without disclosing it to the investors. Note that the gaming argument refers to Structured 
Finance (SF) products only, not to corporate bonds in general. The reason is that in SF, the 
tailoring of portfolio composition is feasible (easy, low cost), while it is infeasible (difficult, 
expensive) if the underlying asset pool is an entire corporation with its fixed assets.  
Third, rating shopping by issuers also contributed to a gradual erosion of rating standards among 
structured finance products. The negative effect follows from the right of issuers to suppress 
ratings which it deems to be unwelcome (unsolicited), thereby exerting pressure on the agencies.  
Incentive misalignment in the industry is not confined to inappropriate securitization techniques 
and incentive conflicts at rating agencies. It also entails compensation systems, both for top 
management and for employees and line management, particularly in trading and sales. The 
problem is an incentive structure which induces a focus on short-term profitability, and a neglect 
of longer-term risks. Examples are bonus payments due at, or shortly after, selling a mortgage 
loan, or fees for issuing structured finance securities. Alternative compensation systems that lead 
to a full appreciation of risk and return will stretch the payoff at least partially over the life of the 
underlying business, thereby making it performance-dependent. The general idea is to add a 
malus component to the compensation scheme.  
Here is a list of concrete measures suggested by the above arguments. 
1.  First loss pieces  
The issuer should be obliged (by law) to inform the market of any change in the size or 
composition of his stake in the first loss piece. This should encourage him to make a binding 
commitment to retain the first loss piece. On the other hand, if the issuer wants to sell the first 
loss poition, then the market can respond immediately, thereby allowing price differentiation of 
issues with and without recourse.  
2.  Ratings.  
Regulatory oversight addresses incentives problems in four areas. First, rating performance (i.e. 
the long-term statistics relating initial ratings to subsequent defaults) should be monitored by the 
regulators, applying high statistical standards. Rating performance relative to outcomes should 
be published regularly (e.g., once a year). Second, to minimize rating shopping, unsolicited 
ratings should be encouraged (e.g. by mandatory rating disclosure). Third, the use of structured 
finance ratings in public regulation has to be reconsidered (and dropped if necessary) in order to 
limit the pressure on agencies, e.g. in Basel II regulation, or in consumer protection regulation. 
Fourth, agencies should be encouraged to adjust their rating methodology to innovations in the 
financial industry, e.g. to flag structured finance ratings, to reveal incentive alignment and first 
loss piece retention as part of the rating information. Furthermore, rating fees should be linked 
to rating performance (either by linking it to default statistics, or by linking it to individual 
tranche performance. In the latter case, agencies might be obliged to buy into the tranches they 
rate (in effect to put their money where their mouth is).  An annual report on rating practice and 
rating competition by a central oversight body might help both to monitor market quality and to 
draw attention to outstanding analytical uncertainties of which investors might be unaware.  
3.  Compensation   11
Since the compensation system influences management behaviour, a stronger reliance on long 
term performance of investment strategies is required in order to achieve incentive alignment. 
New compensation models maybe needed that allow striking a proper balance between long and 
short term orientation, e.g. bonus and malus systems, comparable to pension annuities. We 
propose that the incentive components in management compensation be disclosed on a regular 
basis. As well rating agencies (and other information providers, like auditors) should be 
encouraged to report a firm-level metric that captures incentive alignment in management 
compensation.  
 
A 2.2  Transparency 
The issue of transparency is closely related to the idea of incentive alignment. Through the 
disclosure of appropriate information market participants are assisted to make correct inferences 
on, for example, project risk and return, and market pricing and liquidity. Increased transparency 
is therefore a key requirement for improving market functionality. This being said, one has to 
keep in mind that there are certain institutions, like rating agencies, where some degree of 
secrecy is required for them to perform their task properly. This is why transparency of rating 
processes, as distinct from rating performance, is not recommended, in order to avoid a gaming 
of the system.  
Turning to the inter-bank liquidity crisis that started in the fall of 2007, we see opaqueness of 
true risk exposures after several years of deteriorating credit standards as the major reason for 
the near-universal lack of trust among banks. It seems that on the level of bank assets, even 
experts in banks and rating agencies were no longer able to properly assess the characteristics 
(e.g. the moments) of the underlying credit risk. One reason for the unprecedented degree of 
opaqueness was once again the rising importance of structured finance. These financial 
instruments had loss rate distributions that could not be properly assessed without additional 
information which was not in fact readily available in the market. In particular, one important 
missing piece of information related to how the incentive alignment between originator and 
ultimate borrower had changed dramatically as lending standards worsened after 2005. This is an 
example of a market where an increased degree of disclosure seems likely to improve market 
quality greatly.   
Turning to the market level, the devastating impact that a relatively small segment of the credit 
market, the subprime housing market, had on financial stability in the US and in Europe is 
notable. We see one reason for the crisis escalation in a high degree of interconnectedness 
between financial institutions that had escaped financial stability oversight. While we are 
doubtful that there will ever be powerful early warning systems in financial markets, an 
improved world-wide risk oversight might help to guide central bank and bank supervision 
activities in the future. We therefore envisage the development of a financial risk map, which 
would be regularly updated, summarizing both the exposures of major international financial 
institutions and anomalous market developments that might presage future disruptions. Such a 
risk map would also compile information on the shadow banking system, i.e. on SIVs, hedge 
funds, CDS in order to note early on any tectonic changes in the allocation of risk among 
financial institutions – something that was missing this time around  
It has to be stressed that the methodology for constructing such a financial risk map still needs 
to be developed. Furthermore, for regularly updating the information in the risk map, an 
institution with adequately qualified staff has to be assigned, possibly the IMF or the BIS. A 
closely related task, which can be embedded in the concept of a financial risk map, is the 
creation of an international credit registrar. Such institutions exist in all major countries, but they   12
do not yet aggregate information on cross-border transactions. We now know that cross-border 
financial links are abundant, and need to be considered when evaluating the solvency of any 
financial institution. The credit registrar in Germany is called “Evidenzzentrale”, and it is currently 
managed by the Bundesbank. Although, of course, no real time register can be expected, a 
regularly matrix of liabilities between banks and major corporates may help to maintain 
transparency in international corporate financing, including interbank lending. 
Here is a list of concrete measures suggested by the above arguments. 
1.  We propose to make it mandatory that in securitization transactions the economic first loss 
position is described and its potential allocation in the market is treated as a bond covenant. It 
would therefore be disclosed to the market. Retention by the originator need not and should not 
be mandatory, only disclosure is needed for the market to sort it out, thereby avoiding 
opaqueness of bank portfolio risk. Rating agencies and other information providers (e.g. 
auditors) are supposed to report regularly on compliance. Note that the allocation of first loss 
pieces among market participants has remained a secret to date.  
2.  Furthermore, and reiterating section A 2.1, we propose to disclose on a regular basis the 
incentive components in management compensation, and to encourage rating agencies (and 
other information providers, like auditors) to report a firm-level metric that captures incentive 
alignment in management compensation. Once again, mandatory rules on management 
compensation, such as salary caps or bonus limits, are expected to backfire. Rather than micro-
managing compensation systems, which is likely to produce distortions in the economy, an 
improved approach to financial regulation needs to overcome opaqueness on corporate 
incentive structures, allowing the market to price-differentiate according to incentive alignment.  
3.  We suggest an internationally coordinated effort to draw up a global financial risk map that 
could be updated on a regular basis. The map would attempt to identify building stresses at all 
major cross-border financial institutions and in all major markets (including derivatives and 
markets for credit risk transfer). The details of such a risk reporting system would take time to 
work out, possibly by a task force consisting of market participants, regulators and academics.  
4.  Either as a by-product of the risk map, or as a stand-alone initiative, the creation of a global 
credit register might be considered. Such a register would compile major interbank and 
customer-specific exposure data to allow individual market participants, typically those 
institutions that also deliver the raw data, to learn about major exposures of their counterparties. 
While the value of such information is appreciated almost universally on a national level, there is 
nothing commensurate on an international level. Evidently, even the best register will not be 
able to provide a survey about bank exposures in real time. However, such a register would still 
capture the longer term trends that history shows have often posted the biggest threat to 
financial stability.  
 
A 2.3  Regulation and Supervision 
The crisis has shown that the existing regulatory and supervisory system has important weaknesses 
and gaps (see 1.). In particular, supervisors should think more systematically and understand the 
necessity to moderate the inherent pro-cyclicality of financial markets. The objective must be to 
avoid the build-up of excessive leverage and to reduce the system’s pro-cyclicality. 
Consequently, 
•  Gaps in the supervisory system should be closed,   13
•  Capital requirements should be tightened and 
•  The cooperation of different authorities involved in supervision should be improved. 
a)  Gaps in the supervisory system have been identified in the following areas: 
-  off-balance sheet activities of banks 
-  investments funds (including hedge funds and funds that operate inside broader financial 
institutions, e.g. insurance companies) 
-  credit rating agencies 
-  derivatives  
-  offshore centers  
The objective must be to have a supervisory system without any gaps (see 2.1.). However, the 
necessary measures will differ depending on the nature of the activities. The following measures 
should be considered:  
-  Regulators should supervise financial institutions on a fully consolidated basis (as foreseen in 
Basel II to a large extent) to avoid the emergence of unsupervised risk exposure outside the 
balance sheets. This should help to reduce regulatory arbitrage. 
-  Investment funds operating inside banks, insurance companies or non-financial corporates 
should be supervised comprehensively. 
-  The “indirect” supervision of hedge funds via their regulated creditors needs to be strengthened 
by consolidating the information available from different lenders. 
-   The activities of credit rating agencies should be monitored, including through the 
implementation of a code of conduct (see 2.1.).  
-  The creation of a centralised trading platform for derivatives would help to monitor market 
developments and reduce settlement risks. 
-  Compliance of offshore-centers with relevant regulations could be improved through an 
“indirect” approach if all major financial centers were to cooperate (comparison with FATF) in 
their oversight.. 
 
b)  Capital requirements under Basel 1 have not been sufficient to avoid the build-up of excessive 
leverage, and this does not seem likely to improve (indeed it may worsen) under Basel 2.. A 
tightening along the following lines should be considered after the end of the current crisis: 
-  Introduction of an additional overall leverage ratio of, perhaps, 20 (as suggested by the Swiss 
authorities) in addition to the proposed risk-weighted ratios under Basel 2. 
-  Additional capital requirements for SIVs, conduits and off-balance sheet activities unless they are 
fully consolidated. 
-  Additional capital requirements for lending to hedge funds and lending to non-cooperative off-
shore centers. 
-  Allowance for liquidity risks 
In addition, capital requirements and provisioning rules should be reviewed to make the system less 
pro-cyclical. This could be done by activating one of the following steps during periods of high 
economic growth (like in 2004-07) or high credit growth: 
o  Reduction of the overall leverage ratio.   14
o  Grossing up (under pillar 2) of the capital requirements given by pillar 1. 
o  Increase in premiums for deposit insurance. 
             The activation of such steps would likely benefit from being “automatic”, according to a 
pre-defined rule. The effect of accounting rules (fair-value accounting) on capital requirements 
should also be reviewed to establish whether compensating supervisory requirements might be 
needed.      
 
 
c)  Cooperation among the different authorities and bodies, which are directly or indirectly 
involved in the supervision of financial institutions, should be improved. The following 
possibilities should be considered: 
-  The information flow between national supervisors must be improved. This is essential to obtain 
a complete picture of the situation of cross-border banks, bank holding companies, hedge funds, 
and other investment funds. 
-  The creation of “global colleges of supervisors” for cross-border banks (along the lines of the 
colleges now created in the EU); this would facilitate the necessary information flow at all times 
but also the prospects of quick regulatory action (including the use of public funds, if necessary) 
during difficult times. 
-  Greater consistency in the regulation of different financial entities (banking, insurance, 
securities) when conducting similar businesses.. 
-  Enhanced interaction between institutions with experience in assessing macro-prudential risks 
(central banks, International Financial Institutions) and bodies in charge of assessing micro-
prudential risks (national regulators). An effective early warning system would need to rely on 
the expertise of both groups of institutions.  
 
A 2.4  International Institutions 
As financial markets become more global in nature, international institutions should play a stronger 
role in crisis prevention. However, we believe that the term “Bretton Woods II” could be easily 
misunderstood in this context. The current crisis was not caused by the prevailing “floating” 
exchange rate system. Rather, underlying trends to procyclicality were enhanced by the efforts of 
countries with large trade surpluses to resist appreciation of their exchange rates. Accordingly,  
stronger surveillance over macro-economic policies, exchange rate policies  and global imbalances 
are desirable. 
A stronger role for international institutions is important because a large number of individual 
countries cannot coordinate complex financial market issues in an inter-governmental way. 
However, international standard-setting fora and informal bodies should broaden their membership 
to strengthen their legitimacy. One of the key questions in this context is how to make the Financial 
Stability Forum (FSF) more legitimate and more effective.  
Crisis prevention in the future will also require a more robust macro-economic policy framework. 
For many years, monetary and fiscal policies were over-expansionary in many countries and thus 
contributed to bubbles and the current crisis. The IMF, OECD and the European Commission 
should improve their assessment of fiscal policies. Current instruments to calculate cyclically 
adjusted budget balances are insufficient, for example. Central banks that focused too narrowly on 
inflation targeting and neglected the rapid growth of  of monetary  and credit aggregates may have   15
missed early signs of the emergence of bubbles in financial assets and housing. Policy loosening in 
downturns has often been faster than policy tightening in upswings. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the leading international institution with a global 
membership that supervises the international financial system. The IMF’s role as an international 
“watchdog” should be strengthened. This relates to macro-economic issues, like global imbalances 
and exchange rates, and to financial markets. To this end, the IMF should re-direct its work towards 
a deeper and more comprehensive analysis of financial market developments in the following way: 
-  A stronger focus on spillovers between financial markets and the real economy in its country 
reports and the semi-annual World Economic Outlook. 
-  An assessment of macro-prudential risks in its country reports and the semi-annual Global 
Financial Stability Reports. 
-  Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs) should become mandatory for all IMF members 
states and be conducted on a regular basis. 
-  Comprehensive data on global financial market developments (as a pre-requisite for a global risk 
map, see 2.1.) should be collected by the BIS and analysed by the IMF. Closer cooperation 
between IMF and BIS should be encouraged in this respect.  
With a deeper and more comprehensive knowledge of financial market developments and risks (in 
addition to the Fund’s traditional strength on macro-economics), the IMF could become a better 
“early-warner”.  
However, there are limits to what can be reasonably expected from the IMF: 
-  The more competences and political power the IMF obtains, the greater the interest in political 
control over its work will be. There is an unavoidable trade-off between the neutrality of the 
work of the IMF staff, based on rules, and the political interests of its shareholders.  
-  The IMF does not have the expertise to act as standard setter for financial markets. This task has 
been carried out successfully by committees of national experts meeting at the BIS (see below) 
and elsewhere. Double-work should be avoided.  
-  The IMF does not appear to be suitable to become a global supervisor for the largest 
international banks since that would interfere with national sovereignty, including the     right of 
Parliaments to approve budgetary expenditures in case of solvency problems (more suitable 
solution: colleges of supervisors, see above). 
Finally, a stronger role for the IMF requires that the voting structure (quotas) of its members is kept 
under permanent review. The growing weight of emerging economies will require further reductions 
in the weight of advanced economies in the IMF. 
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has a clear mandate for global financial stability, 
has more expertise in regulatory and supervisory issues than any other international institution, was 
more successful than others in warning early about the current crisis and collects a huge amount of 
financial market data. These strengths of the BIS should be preserved and used effectively.  
-  Most of the measures proposed above (under 2.3.) would have to be discussed and agreed in the 
framework of the BIS or one of its committees.  
-  However, the BIS suffers from a lack of legitimacy because its core decision-making bodies and 
committees are dominated by G-10 countries. For example, Japan is the only Asian country in 
the key “Basel Committee on Banking Supervision”; China and Mexico are the only 
representatives from emerging markets on the BIS Board that comprises 20 members. 
The Financial Stability Forum (FSF), created in 1999 to bring together Finance Ministries, 
Central Banks and Supervisors from G7 countries, has become the key body to coordinate and   16
advocate regulatory and supervisory reforms. It has worked well for the G7 but also suffers from a 
lack of legitimacy globally as only a very small number of non-G7 financial market centers attend as 
observers. No large emerging economy is represented in the FSF.  
A key question will be how to use the expertise of the FSF effectively at the global level. We believe 
that the FSF should continue to be anchored at the BIS (where currently the Secretariat of the FSF 
is located) but that the links between the FSF and the IMF should be strengthened. A merger of the 
FSF with the IMF appears neither feasible nor efficient. 
However, ways to strengthen the legitimacy of the FSF, without loosing its effectiveness, need to be 
considered. 
 
The membership of the FSF could evolve in line with the future composition of the G7/8. The G7 
has played the principal steering role for the global financial system for three decades. This is 
changing and the meeting of the G20 in Washington on 15 November 2008 is a clear indication of 
that. If the G7/8 were enlarged by the largest emerging economies, such as China, India and Brasil, 
this should have automatic consequences at the “working level”, such as the FSF, but also the Basel 
Committee on Banking Regulation. 
The European dimension. The current financial crisis has also highlighted the weaknesses in the 
EU’s supervisory framework, which remains fragmented along national lines despite the substantial 
progress achieved in financial market integration over the last decade and the increased importance 
of cross-border entities. A reform of the European supervisory framework is essential to create a 
truly integrated financial market in the EU and to protect the Single Market and the Euro. 
Although these issues are unlikely to be discussed by the G-20 on 15 November, the European 
experience can be useful in revealing the problems and pitfalls in creating a more efficient, less crisis-
prone regulatory system. For example, while it appears essential, over time, to establish a Single 
Regulator for the largest cross-border banks in the EU, this seems to be impossible at the global 
level because of potential budgetary implications and unresolved accountability issues. The EU has a 
50-year history of transferring sovereignty to the European level if necessary for the good 
functioning of the Single Market. This will make it much easier (not easy) for the EU to make 
progress in all the areas mentioned above (2.1 to 2.3) related to transparency, incentives, regulation 
and supervision. The EU should therefore take the lead in implementing these proposals. 
 
A 3.  Concluding remarks 
A number of our recommendations are more or less straightforward and in line with those by the 
FSF, other institutions, or individual authors. On some issues more information and research is 
needed. This is one reason to warn against premature conclusions and even more against hasty 
decisions. The elements of a new and better financial architecture must interact in a positive way and 
support each other. This cannot be achieved by quick and unavoidably short-sighted actions. It is 
also important that the crisis management –increasingly with the duration and dimension of 
measures- takes into account the impact on the future development of financial markets. This refers 
not only to exit strategies for state interventions in banks etc., but also to the creation for a stable, 
non-inflationary environment. 
Proposals for strengthening the financial architecture are basically focused on providing better rules 
for private actors. This is very important, but not enough. As the analysis of the underlying causes 
shows, the crisis would not have gained such a dimension without a macroeconomic environment of 
massive liquidity and persistent low interest rates. As a consequence sound macro policies and 
prudent rules for individual actors have to go hand in hand.   